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Abstract
The issue of bias-motivated crimes has attracted consderable attention in re-
cent years. In this paper, we develop an economic framework to analyze penalty
enhancements for bias-motivated crimes. We extend the standard model by in-
troducing two different groups of potential victims of crime, and assume that a
potential offender’s benefits from a crime depend on the group to which the vic-
tim belongs. We begin with the assumption that the harm to an individual victim
from a bias-motivated crime is identical to that from an equivalent non-hate crime.
Nonetheless, we derive the result that a pattern of crimes disproportionately tar-
geting an identifiable group leads to greater social harm. This conclusion follows
both from a model where disparities in groups’ victimization probabilities lead to
social losses due to fairness concerns, as well as a model where potential victims
have the opportunity to undertake socially costly victimization avoidance activi-
ties. In particular, penalty enhancements can reduce the incentives for avoidance
activity, and thereby protect the networks of profitable interactions that link mem-
bers of different groups. We also argue that those groups that are covered by
hate crime statutes tend to be those whose characteristics make it especially likely
that penalty enhancement is socially optimal. Finally, we consider a number of
other issues related to hate crimes, including teh choice of sanctions from behind
a Rawlsian ’veil of ignorance’ concerning group identity.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K14, K42
Keywords: law enforcement, hate crimes
1 Introduction
In recent years, the issue of bias-motivated crimes against members of minor-
ity groups has attracted considerable public attention.1 Many state legislatures
have enacted ‘hate crime’ laws (hereafter, HCLs) that establish enhanced penal-
ties for bias crimes.2 These laws, and the underlying social issue, have been the
subject of considerable academic and public debate. However, the economic
model of crime and law enforcement (e.g. Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell,
2000a) has previously not been applied to the analysis of HCLs.3 The objec-
tive of this paper is to develop an economic framework for the analysis of hate
crimes. We extend the standard economic model by introducing two different
groups of potential victims of crime, and allow for the possibility that potential
offenders may derive different benefits from crimes against each group.
The central issue in the study of HCLs is how (and whether) to justify sen-
tencing enhancements.4 From an economic perspective, the central considera-
tion in determining sanctions is social harm. Thus, if it could be assumed that a
hate crime causes more harm to the victim than does a physically identical non-
hate crime, then it would follow straightforwardly that penalty enhancements
are socially optimal. Indeed, McDevitt et al. (2001) find evidence that the
psychological harms experienced by the ‘primary’ (i.e. direct) victims of bias-
motivated assaults are more severe than those experienced by the victims of
1This concern has been spurred by several horrifying high-profile incidents, such as the
murder of James C. Byrd, Jr. in Jasper, Texas in 1998, and a number of mass shootings in
1999 and 2000. In particular, in the summer of 1999, Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, a member
of the hate-based World Church of the Creator, carried out a series of shootings in Illinois
and Indiana. The same summer, neo-Nazi activist Buford O’Neal Furrow, Jr., perpetrated
shootings of minorities in the Los Angeles area. In the spring of 2000, a lawyer named Richard
Scott Baumhammers also targeted minorities in a series of shootings in the Pittsburgh area.
See e.g. E. Ferkenhoff and M. Ko, “Killer’s Trail of Blood”, Chicago Tribune, July 5, 1999;
H. Weinstein, “Furrow Gets 5 Life Terms for Racist Rampage”, Los Angeles Times, March
27, 2001; Anonymous, “Racist Killer of 5 Gets Death Sentence”, New York Times, May 12,
2001.
2There are two types of hate crime statutes. One is based on the ‘animus’ model, and
requires hostility on the part of the perpetrator to the victim’s group. The other is based
on the ‘discriminatory selection’ model, upheld by the US Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). The latter punishes the selection of victims on the basis of
group characteristics, independently of any animus towards the group.
3Gale, Heath and Ressler (1998) develop an empirical analysis of hate crime. Jefferson and
Pryor (1999) examine the determinants of the geographical distribution of hate groups, but
do not address the issue of hate crimes.
4The early legal literature on HCLs addressed their constitutionality (e.g. Gellman, 1991).
Much of the subsequent legal literature has adopted a retributivist perspective, focusing on
setting penalties in accordance with the moral wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s actions. Dillof
(1997) terms this the wrongfulness/culpability paradigm (WCP). Within this paradigm, pro-
ponents of HCLs argue that hate crimes involve a ‘greater wrong’ than non-bias-motivated
crimes. Harel and Parchomovsky (1999) develop a critique of the WCP, arguing that it fails to
provide a secure intellectual foundation for HCLs. Instead, they advocate a victim-centered
perspective (discussed further in Section 4 below). Hylton (1996) is one of the few examples in
the legal literature of an analysis of HCLs from an economic perspective; the central argument
is that the Federal government should require states to enact HCLs in order to correct for the
suboptimal enforcement efforts of some states in dealing with crimes against minorities.
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similar non-bias-motivated assaults. However, the notion that penalty enhance-
ments can be justified by reference to greater harmfulness has been criticized
(Kahan (2001) calls it the ‘greater harm fallacy’), and is controversial among
legal scholars. Even advocates of HCLs such as Harel and Parchomovsky (1999,
p. 530) argue that “the harm inflicted by a crime against a vulnerable vic-
tim is not necessarily greater than the harm inflicted by a crime against a less
vulnerable victim.”5
We hope to advance this debate in the following way. We begin with the as-
sumption that the harm to an individual victim from a hate crime is identical to
that from an equivalent non-hate crime. However, we then seek to endogenously
derive disparities in the social harms that result from a pattern of discrimina-
tory selection of victims. That is, we show that even if a particular hate crime
causes the same harm to its victim as an identical non-hate crime, a pattern of
crimes disproportionately targeting an identifiable group causes greater harm
than does a pattern of crimes where targets are randomly chosen.6
This endogenous disparity in social harms is generated through two mecha-
nisms that are distinct (but not mutually exclusive). The first relates to fairness
concerns. In our framework, with different distributions of benefits from crimes,
members of the disfavored group (labeled group B) will face a higher probabil-
ity of victimization in equilibrium if sanctions for hate and non-hate crimes are
identical. If individuals (whether members of the dominant group or of a mi-
nority group) suffer disutility because this disparity violates ideals of fairness
(rather as Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) assume that individuals experience disu-
tility from the imposition of ‘unfair’ sanctions on offenders), then there will be
a social loss from the failure to impose penalty enhancements.
The second mechanism assumes that individuals can undertake avoidance
activities; thus, a B can avoid contact with members of the dominant group
(labeled A), and thereby reduce her probability of victimization.7 It is assumed
that avoidance activities merely displace hate crimes onto other Bs, and is thus
socially wasteful (however, the results extend to the case where these activi-
ties have some social value by reducing crime levels). The social waste occurs
because avoidance involves foregoing opportunities for profitable transactions
with As (in addition to any direct costs). Of course, non-hate crimes may also
lead to avoidance activities. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the
behavioral elasticity in response to hate crimes is much larger, because potential
victims can easily identify and avoid members of group A, rather than having
to avoid all individuals.8
5For other perspectives on this issue, see Wang (1999, 2000), Simons (2000), Blake (2001)
and Posner (2001, pp. 233f). A more empirically oriented view is provided by Iganski (2001).
6Of course, if the harm inflicted on primary victims by bias-motivated crimes is greater,
as suggested by the empirical findings of McDevitt et al. (2001), this would simply reinforce
our argument.
7Note that victimization avoidance should not be confused with avoidance activities by
criminals to lower their probability of detection. For a model with avoidance activities by
criminals, see Malik (1990).
8Note the analogy here with the relative behavioral responses to a narrowly-based tax and
a broad-based tax.
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Taking avoidance activities into account makes penalty enhancements opti-
mal in a wider range of circumstances. Hate crimes can be regarded as attacks
on the social networks that connect different groups. The threat of such crimes
induces members of the disfavored group to avoid the dominant group, forego-
ing profitable interactions. This social waste can be ameliorated by instituting
penalty enhancements. Thus, we ultimately agree with the position that: “The
primary justification for bias crime laws is to redress the greater harms caused
by bias crime” (Wang, 1999, p. 805); however, we emphasize the importance of
deriving these greater harms endogenously, rather than simply assuming their
existence. It should be noted that the Supreme Court, in upholding the Wis-
consin bias crime statute at issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell9 explicitly noted
that “this conduct [the perpetration of hate crimes] is thought to inflict greater
individual and societal harm.” We hope that our model helps to explain why
this is the case.
Our second goal is to propose an explanation for why some types of bias-
motivated crimes are subject to penalty enhancements, while others are not.
The formulation used in our model to capture the notion of bias (involving
different benefits from crimes against members of different groups) is completely
general, in the sense that it can be used to represent bias against a group such
as the homeless as well as bias against racial minorities. However, the scope
of HCLs is typically restricted to certain groups. Recently, Posner (2001, pp.
233f) has argued that the subset of groups who gain the protection of HCLs is
determined not by issues of principle, but by interest group pressures. Against
this view, we contend that the efficiency and fairness concerns analyzed in this
paper not only justify the use of penalty enhancements in certain circumstances,
but also help to explain which groups should be protected by HCLs.
In particular, in Section 2, we establish a condition on the probability dis-
tributions of criminal benefits that is sufficient for penalty enhancements to be
optimal purely on efficiency grounds (this condition embodies a tradeoff between
the value of deterrence and the costs of imposing punishment). In Sections 3
and 4, fairness concerns and the possibility of avoidance activities are incorpo-
rated to yield analogous conditions. When these conditions are satisfied for a
particular group B, then it is socially optimal to enact penalty enhancements
that punish bias-motivated crimes against Bs more severely. However, it is not
optimal to enact penalty enhancements for a group for which these conditions
are not satisfied. Moreover, we argue in Section 5 below that the observed
pattern of the types of groups included in HCLs closely tracks what our theo-
retical results would suggest. For example, HCLs typically apply to groups who
have faced a long history of prejudice; thus, one would expect that there are a
relatively large number of potential offenders who would derive especially large
benefits from attacking such groups, and hence that HCLs can deter a relatively
large number of such offenders. In addition, HCLs usually apply to groups that
are identifiable by immutable characteristics, or who face large costs of changing
or disguising their group identity. Potential victims from such groups can only
9Supra note 2 at 487-488.
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reduce their probability of victimization by avoiding members of the dominant
group A (rather than, for instance, by ‘passing’ as As), so the social losses from
avoidance activity by such groups are likely to be especially large.
In Section 2, the basic model is introduced. Fairness concerns are introduced
in Section 3, and the extension with avoidance activities is developed in Section
4. Section 5 discusses some implications of the results, while Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The Basic Model
Our model is based on the framework presented in Polinsky and Shavell (2000a).
Individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral, with the population size normalized
to 1. In their model, individuals can commit an act that causes harm h to
society. If an individual commits this offense, she is detected with probability
p and bears a (monetary) sanction s.10 An individual decides to commit an
offense if the illegal gain b exceeds the expected sanction ps.
In our model, each potential offender belongs to an identifiable group (e.g.
an ethnic group) that will be referred to as group A. A potential offender has
exactly two opportunities to commit a crime, one against another member of
group A, and the other against a member of a different group of equal size,
denoted as group B.11 The distribution function for benefits from crimes against
members of group A is represented by FA(b); b is the level of benefits, where
b ∈ [0, bA], and FA(b) is the fraction of individuals deriving benefits less than
b from the crime against A. The distribution function for benefits from crimes
against members of group B is represented by FB(b), where b ∈ [0, bB], and
FB(b) is the fraction of individuals deriving benefits less than b from the crime
against B. The probability density functions are denoted by fA(b) and fB(b),
respectively.12
It is assumed that potential offenders receive ‘larger’ benefits from commit-
ting the crime against Bs rather than As.13 This assumption, which is intended
to capture the idea of bias against Bs in the selection of victims, entails that:
1) bA < bB ,
10Their results can easily be extended to the case of nonmonetary sanctions; note that we
assume costly punishment in the analysis that follows.
11A more general formulation, in which Bs can attack As as well as As attacking Bs, can
be developed, but does not lead to significantly different conclusions.
12Note that, unlike in the basic economic model, the benefits from crime here include gains
that are nonmonetary in nature (e.g. ideological gratification).
13Our formalization closely parallels Wang’s (1999) informal discussion of the ‘discrimina-
tory victim selection’ model, where a bias crime requires that the fact that the victim belongs
to a certain group is a significant or a substantial factor in the decision whether or not to
commit a crime. According to this model, a rational criminal takes the victim’s characteristics
into account in planning a crime, and, in the case of a bias-motivated crime, the benefit from
this crime is enhanced relative to a similar crime but with a different victim.
Note that it can be argued that for some crimes (such as cross-burning) the perpetrator’s
benefits depend entirely on the identity of the victim (so they would never commit the crime
against As). This can easily be accommodated in this framework by setting bA = 0 and
FA(0) = 1.
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2) for given b, FA(b) > FB(b) (which implies that 1− FA(b) < 1− FB(b))
3) for low values of b, fA(b) > fB(b); for high values of b, fA(b) < fB(b).
As discussed in the Introduction, the harm from the crime is assumed to be
h, regardless of whether it is committed against an A or a B. The government
cannot observe the benefits derived by offenders (which seems reasonable, given
that we include nonmonetary gains), although it knows the probability distrib-
utions of these benefits.14 In particular, the government can determine ex post
(at trial) whether or not the crime was bias-motivated (i.e. it can determine the
offender’s relative benefits from attacking Bs rather than As). Consequently, it
can be assumed without loss of generality that different penalties can be estab-
lished for crimes against As than those for crimes against Bs. The idea is not
that sanctions depend on the victim’s identity per se, but rather that non-bias-
motivated crimes against Bs are essentially identical to crimes against As, and
so do not need to be analyzed separately.
As in Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (1999), punishment is assumed
to be costly in this model. If punishment were costless, the issue of penalty
enhancements would be moot, as penalties would always be set at the maximal
levels that will deter all crime. The cost of punishment is denoted by c(s), where
s is the punishment, and c(s) is assumed to be increasing and convex. There is
an exogenous probability of detection p that is fixed regardless of whether the
crime is against an A or a B.15 Let sA be the penalty for crimes against As,
and sB be the penalty for (bias-motivated) crimes against Bs. The number of
individuals committing the crime against As will then be 1− FA(psA), and the
number of individuals committing the crime against Bs will be 1 − FB(psB).
It follows straightforwardly from Assumption (2) that, if there are no penalty
enhancements (sA = sB), then Bs will face a higher probability of victimization
in equilibrium (this theme is developed further in Section 4).
Following the standard framework (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a), social wel-
fare should be defined as the sum of benefits minus harm from crimes, minus
punishment costs. Given the assumptions above, aggregate social welfare is:
W =
Z bA
psA
(b− h− pc(sA))dFA(b) +
Z bB
psB
(b− h− pc(sB))dFB(b) (1)
While common, the practice of including benefits from crime in the social
welfare function has given rise to some controversy, both within and outside the
law and economics tradition. In this particular context, it may be argued by
some that the inclusion of that component of illegal gains directly attributable
to hatred of Bs (i.e. the extra benefit derived by attacking Bs relative to that
14 If the precise benefits were known to the government, then an argument for the efficiency
of penalty enhancements could be developed through a straightforward extension of Shavell
(1987). In particular, if the gain to a perpetrator from a hate crime is higher than the gain
from an otherwise identical crime against an A, the expected sanction should be higher, even
though sanctions are never actually applied.
15This is not to deny that the extent and vigor of law enforcement activity may differ
depending on the identity of the victim (e.g. Hylton, 1996); however, the focus here is not on
this issue.
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from committing the same offense against As) is especially unattractive from
an ethical standpoint. In response to such concerns, we follow Shavell (1985)
in assuming that society weights criminal gains from offenses against As and
Bs by 0 ≤ σj ≤ 1 (j = A,B). In view of the bias against Bs that exists
among potential offenders, it may be thought that society should discount the
gains obtained by bias-motivated offenders more, so that σA > σB. Given the
assumptions above, aggregate social welfare can now be expressed as:
W =
Z bA
psA
(σAb− h− pc(sA))dFA(b) +
Z bB
psB
(σBb− h− pc(sB))dFB(b) (2)
Notice that (2) is reduced to (1) when σA = σB = 1. Thus, (1) is a particular
case of (2).
The social objective is to choose sA and sB to maximize the above expression.
The first order condition with respect to sj (j = A,B) is:
[h+ pc(sj)− σjpsj ]fj(psj)p− pc0(1− Fj(psj)) = 0
The second order condition is assumed to be satisfied.16
Rearranging the first order condition:
fj(psj)
1− Fj(psj)
[h+ pc(sj)− σjpsj ] = c0 (3)
The left-hand-side is the marginal benefit and the right-hand-side is the
marginal cost. Suppose it is optimal to impose the same sanction (sA = sB).
The marginal cost (right-hand-side) is the same for both A and B. Thus, the
marginal benefit (left-hand-side) must be the same. As a consequence, it must
be true that at the optimum:
fA(psA)
[1− FA(psA)]
[h+ pc(sA)− σApsA] =
fB(psB)
[1− FB(psB)]
[h+ pc(sB)− σBpsB]
In other words, if it is optimal to have a policy given by sA < sB, it must
be the case that the marginal benefit of deterring As is much lower than the
marginal benefit of deterring Bs.
Let us rearrange (3) so that we have:
[h+ pc(sj)− psj ]/c0 = [1− Fj(psj)]/fj(psj)− (1− σj)psj/c0 (4)
A necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the optimal sA is less
than the optimal sB is:
1− FA(b)
fA(b)
+ (σA − σB)psA/c0 >
1− FB(b)
fB(b)
(5)
16The SOC will be satisfied if it is assumed that c00 is sufficiently positive:
(2c0 − σj)fj(psj)p2 + [h+ pc(sj)− σjpsj ]f 0j(psj)p2 − pc00(1− Fj(psj)) < 0
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for any given b in the relevant neighborhood (i.e., for values of b in the neigh-
borhood of psA).
The intuition for the condition above can be clarified as follows. The left-
hand-side of (4) is the same when sA = sB . Thus, it will be optimal to have
sA < sB when the right-hand-side is greater for As than for Bs by the principle of
maximization. In fact, the left-hand-side can be regarded as ‘marginal benefit’
(the marginal value of deterrence) and the right-hand-side can represent the
‘marginal cost’ of raising punishment. It will be optimal to have sA < sB when,
for the same marginal benefit, the marginal cost of punishing crimes against As
is higher than punishing crimes against Bs.
Our results suggest that bias-motivated crimes should be punished more
severely if and only if (5) is satisfied. Thus, penalty enhancements are optimal
for a subset of bias-motivated crimes, namely, those that satisfy (5) - i.e. those
for which the marginal cost of punishment is lower for a given marginal benefit.
Another implication relates to the conditions under which (5) is more likely to be
satisfied. Given our assumptions about the probability distributions (FA(b) >
FB(b) for large b), it is more likely that a bias-motivated crime should incur
enhanced penalties when
(a) fA(b) is sufficiently smaller than fB(b) (in the relevant range): i.e. the
density of deterred offenses at the margin is higher for crimes against Bs than
for those against As. By increasing punishment against both types of offenses
at the margin, more offenses against Bs will be deterred than offenses against
As.
(b) σA is sufficiently larger than σB: i.e. society weights offenses against As
significantly more than those against Bs. As a consequence, the social damage
caused by offenses against Bs is higher than social damage caused by offenses
against As (even though the direct harm h is assumed to be the same for both).
Finally, note that, in a pure utilitarian framework (where σA = σB = 1),
relatively fewer bias-motivated crimes would be punished with enhanced penal-
ties.
3 Incorporating Fairness Considerations
The analysis so far has focused mainly on efficiency criteria for the optimality
of penalty enhancements. However, as discussed earlier, much of the previous
literature on the issue has been framed in terms of fairness concerns. This section
incorporates such considerations into our analysis of HCLs in two different ways.
First, we discuss a Rawlsian approach to hate crimes; then, we focus on the ‘fair
protection’ approach of Harel and Parchomovsky (1999).
3.1 A Rawlsian Approach to HCLs
The condition above (5) for the optimality of penalty enhancements was derived
purely on efficiency grounds, with the penalties chosen to maximize social wel-
fare. However, because the issues surrounding HCLs often involve immutable
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group differences, the literature on the topic has emphasized fairness concerns.
One approach to modeling fairness concerns is to use the ‘veil of ignorance’ con-
struct of Rawls (1971), where individuals are required to make social decisions
while unaware of certain morally irrelevant characteristics they will have when
subject to the effects of those decisions. In this context, a Rawlsian approach
entails a representative individual choosing sA and sB without knowing whether
she belongs to group A or to group B.17 The surprising result here is that this
decision problem gives rise to essentially the same condition for the optimality
of penalty enhancements as that in (5).
Suppose that a representative individual is placed behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of
ignorance’, where she has an equal probability (of 1/2) of being an A or being
a B. If she becomes an A, she will face the probability of victimization that
pertains to As, and may also anticipate deriving benefits from crimes against
As and/or Bs. The latter possibility depends on whether her criminal benefits bA
and bB are sufficiently high for her to commit a crime, and thus depends on the
distribution functions FA(b) and FB(b) of benefits from crime. In addition to the
harm from victimization and the possible benefits from crime, she faces taxation
by the government to finance the costs of imposing penalties on offenders. It
is assumed that these costs are financed by uniform lump-sum taxes, imposed
equally on As and Bs (so that she bears 1/2 the tax cost, regardless of her
group). Thus, the payoff if she becomes an A, denoted V A, can be expressed
as:
V A = −h(1− FA(psA)) +
Z bA
psA
(b− psA)dFA(b) +
Z bB
psB
(b− psB)dFB(b)− T/2
where T is the aggregate level of taxation to finance the costs of imposing
penalties on offenders.
The representative individual also faces a 1/2 probability of becoming a B.
If she is a B, she faces the probability of victimization that pertains to Bs.
In addition, she faces half the tax costs T of imposing sanctions on offenders.
However, because (by assumption) Bs do not enjoy any opportunities for crime,
she does not anticipate any possible criminal benefits if she becomes a B. Thus,
the payoff from being a B, denoted by V B, can be expressed as:
V B = −h(1− FB(psB))− T/2
Note also that the government faces a budget constraint
T =
Z bA
psA
p(c(sA)− sA)dFA(b) +
Z bB
psB
p(c(sB)− sB)dFB(b)
The representative individual’s program behind the veil of ignorance is to
choose sA and sB to maximize her expected payoff (1/2)V A + (1/2)V B (or
17The application of a Rawlsian approach to criminal law issues is novel, although it has been
used in other areas of law and economics (e.g. Fischel and Shapiro (1989) on compensation
for takings).
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V A + V B) subject to the budget constraint above. Substituting the constraint
into the objective function, the expected payoff can be expressed as (1). Solv-
ing this for the representative individual’s optimal choices of sA and sB leads
to essentially the same conditions as those for the social welfare maximization
problem. The conditions for penalty enhancement to be optimal for the repre-
sentative individual are thus similar to those in (5) for the efficiency of penalty
enhancement when σA = σB = 1.
The above analysis did not make any particular assumptions about the repre-
sentative individual’s attitudes towards risk. The Rawlsian approach generally
assumes risk-aversion on the part of decisionmakers. In this context, this in-
volves replacing the harm h in the expected payoff with some concave function
u(h) of h. Doing so will increase the optimal penalty levels sA and sB, but
will not alter the relative levels of the sanctions, and thus will not change the
conditions for the optimality of penalty enhancements.
The intuition for this surprising equivalence between the efficiency and Rawl-
sian approaches can be summarized as follows. In a typical Rawlsian scenario,
different states of the world lead to different incomes. Here, they lead to dif-
ferent probabilities of victimization, with the harm h being the same whether
one is an A or a B. In a standard expected utility calculation, risk aversion is
defined only over the payoffs, not the probabilities, so the expected utility is
always linear in the probabilities. As h is the same in each state of the world,
risk aversion over h will not change the relative sanctions that are chosen.
3.2 Fair Protection
Recall that, in the equilibrium of our basic model, a member of group A has a
probability 1−FA(sA) of being victimized, whereas a member of group B faces
a probability 1 − FB(sB) of being victimized; in general, these probabilities
will differ, so that an individual’s vulnerability to crime depends on her group
classification.
Harel and Parchomovsky (1999) (hereafter HP) advocate a victim-centered
approach (termed the ‘fair protection’ paradigm (FPP)) to HCLs, based on
the premise that criminal law should distribute protection from crime ‘fairly’.
While they do not define fairness precisely, HP argue that, at a minimum, the
state should counteract the effects of race and other group characteristics on an
individual’s ‘vulnerability’ (measured by the expected costs of crime). Within
their perspective, considerations of equality or fairness require that the criminal
justice system should seek to equate the probabilities 1−FA(sA) and 1−FB(sB),
or at least to reduce disparities between them.
This fairness notion can be captured by assuming that there exists a social
cost given by:
u = h(FB(psB)− FA(psA))2/2 (6)
This can be regarded as either representing a direct concern for fairness in the
specification of the social welfare function, or as a reduced form characteriza-
tion of a situation in which individuals have a concern for fairness, and suffer
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disutility from observing disparities in the victimization probabilities. The latter
interpretation is analogous to that of the model in Polinsky and Shavell (2000b),
where individuals experience disutility from observing ‘unfair’ sanctions being
imposed on offenders. It should be noted that, in this model, the disutility from
‘unfairness’ can be experienced by both As and Bs. What is envisaged here
is not simply that Bs suffer extra disutility when they are targeted, but that
disparate victimization violates widely held notions of fairness, shared by most
As as well as Bs.
Aggregate social welfare can be characterized as:
W =
Z bA
psA
(σAb− h− pc(sA))dFA(b) +
Z bB
psB
(σBb− h− pc(sB))dFB(b)− u (7)
The first order conditions are:
[h+ pc(sA)− σApsA]fA(psA)p− pc0(1− FA(psA))
+h(FB(psB)− FA(psA))fAp = 0
[h+ pc(sB)− σBpsB]fB(psB)p− pc0(1− FB(psB))
−h(FB(psB)− FA(psA))fBp = 0
The second order conditions are assumed to be satisfied. Rearranging the
first order conditions:
[h+ pc(sA)− σApsA]/c0 = [1− FA(psA)]/fA(psA)− (FB(psB)− FA(psA))h/c0
[h+ pc(sB)− σBpsB ]/c0 = [1− FB(psB)]/fB(psB) + (FB(psB)− FA(psA))h/c0
The following condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that optimal sA
is less than optimal sB :
1− FA(b)
fA(b)
+ (σA − σB)psA/c0 + 2(FA(b)− FB(b))h/c0 >
1− FB(b)
fB(b)
(8)
for any given b in the relevant neighborhood (i.e., for values of b in the neigh-
borhood of psA).
It is important to note that there are circumstances in which condition (5)
is not satisfied, but where (8) is satisfied. The new term on the left-hand-side is
strictly positive, and makes lower values of sA and higher values of sB (relative
to those derived in Section 2) socially optimal. Thus, some bias-motivated
crimes that would not be subject to penalty enhancement under a pure efficiency
perspective will come within the purview of HCLs under HP paradigm.
The approach taken above is closely related to that of Polinsky and Shavell
(2000b). However, they examine the perceived fairness of sanctions per se,
whereas the model here extends this concern to the fairness of the probabilities of
victimization that result from the choice of sanctions. We should emphasize that
most arguments that have been made for HCLs are related to this fairness-based
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rationale. In essence, they involve the idea that hate crimes (and the associated
disparities in the probability of victimization) violate ideals of fairness, leading
to a social loss either intrinsically or through the utility losses suffered by those
who observe these crimes and disparities. Our model thus provides a succinct
formalization of the most prevalent justifications for HCLs.
4 Introducing Avoidance Activities
In the previous section, we introduced an exogenous social loss from disparities
across groups in the likelihood of victimization. In this section, we consider
a more specific source of this social loss. In particular, while still relying on
the idea that a major problem with bias-motivated crimes is that they lead to
different probabilities of victimization across different groups, we propose an
efficiency-based approach here that is distinct from the fairness notion of the
HP paradigm.
We have shown earlier that the results obtained in Section 2 continue to
hold when sA and sB are chosen by a representative individual behind a veil
of ignorance. Now, assume that after the veil is lifted and group membership
is revealed, individuals, taking sA and sB as given, can expend resources in
avoiding victimization. That is, it is possible for victims of each group to avoid
As, thereby foregoing some profitable transactions, but (probabilistically) dis-
placing crime onto other victims of the same group. For example, an individual
B can reduce his probability of victimization by avoiding contact with As, but
determined offenders will nonetheless find some other B to attack.18
The probability that an individual from group A is a victim is given by
(1 − FA)(1 − γ(xA, x¯A)) and the probability that an individual from group
B is a victim is given by (1 − FB)(1 − γ(xB , x¯B)), where xj is expenditure on
victimization avoidance by each individual of group j and x¯j is total expenditure
on victimization avoidance by group j, j = A,B. These ‘expenditures’ can be
regarded as the lost surplus from transactions that do not occur because of the
avoidance of potential offenders (although direct costs of avoidance could also
be included).
The probabilistic displacement function γ(x, x¯) has the following properties:
γx > 0 and γxx < 0. We have assumed a continuous population normalized to
one. Thus, each individual is negligible, so that x/x¯→ 0. Each individual takes
x¯ as given, so that γx¯ < 0. Clearly, γ(0, 0) = 0, and if every individual of a
given group spends the same amount x, γ(., .) = 0.19
18 Since in equilibrium there is no actual displacement, the assumption that displacement is
only possible within the same group is for convenience and without loss of generality.
19Note that we present a model of (probabilistic) victimization displacement, and not of
victims’ precaution. Thus, the resources spent x have no effect on the probability of detection
of criminals. More realistically, victims’ avoidance expenditures will both deter and displace
crime. Nonetheless, as long as there is some displacement effect, the results of this section
will hold (however, the socially optimal level of victim avoidance will be positive, rather than
zero). See Garoupa (2001) for an analysis of victim behavior.
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The expected payoff of an individual of group A is:
V A = −h(1− FA(psA))(1− γ(xA, x¯A)) +
Z bA
psA
(b− psA)dFA(b)
+
Z bB
psB
(b− psB)dFB(b)− T/2− xA
The expected payoff of an individual of group B is:
V B = −h(1− FB(psB))(1− γ(xB , x¯B))− T/2− xB
Each individual of group j = A,B will spend x∗j on victimization avoidance:
γxj (x
∗
j )h(1− Fj(psj)) = 1
and the second-order condition is always satisfied. The amount of resources
spent x∗j increases with h(1− Fj) and thus decreases with sj (since more crim-
inals are deterred). Note that x∗j is a reaction function. Solving for the Nash
equilibrium, we derive xˆj , which presumably increases with h(1 − Fj) and de-
creases with sj . More importantly, λj(xˆj , x¯j) = 0 because all individuals within
a group are identical. Each individual spends a positive amount of resources on
avoidance, but ends up facing the same probability of victimization as she would
have in the absence of the possibility of avoidance activity. Total expenditure
x¯j is increasing in h(1 − Fj) and decreasing in sj . Note that for sA = sB, we
will have x∗B > x
∗
A because FA > FB. For the same level of sanctions, the Bs
will waste more resources than the As because they have a higher likelihood of
being victims.
Aggregate social welfare can be characterized as:
W =
Z bA
psA
(σAb−h−pc(sA))dFA(b)+
Z bB
psB
(σBb−h−pc(sB))dFB(b)−x¯A−x¯B (9)
where the aggregate expenditures on avoidance activities represent a social loss
(as displacement generates no social benefit while leading to lost trading oppor-
tunities).
The social objective is to choose sA and sB to maximize the above expression.
The first order condition with respect to sj (j = A,B) is:
[h+ pc(sj)− σjpsj ]fj(psj)p− pc0(1− Fj(psj)) + px¯0jhfj = 0
The second order condition is assumed to be satisfied. Rearranging the first
order condition:
[h+ pc(sj)− σjpsj ]/c0 = [1− Fj(psj)]/fj(psj)− x¯0jh/c0
The following condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that optimal sA
is less than optimal sB :
1− FA(b)
fA(b)
+ (σA − σB)psA/c0 + (x¯0B − x¯0A)h/c0 >
1− FB(b)
fB(b)
(10)
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for any given b in the relevant neighborhood (i.e., for values of b in the neigh-
borhood of psA). Note the similarities between (8) and (10). Taking the pos-
sibility of socially wasteful avoidance expenditures into account leads to a con-
dition that closely resembles our earlier formal characterization of Harel and
Parchomovsky’s FPP without, however, relying on fairness considerations.
The intuition for condition (10) can be summarized as follows. Consider the
values of sA and sB that emerge from the social optimization problem in Section
2. Introducing avoidance activities makes it socially efficient to increase both
sA and sB, as doing so reduces the social waste from displacement activities.
However, Bs engage in more avoidance activity for any given penalty level, as
they face a higher probability of victimization. Thus, in general, it will be
socially optimal to raise sB relative to sA, as there is a larger social gain from
inducing Bs to reduce their avoidance activities. As a consequence, it may be the
case that some bias-motivated crimes that would not incur penalty enhancement
by the condition in Section 2 should do so according to (10) because penalty
enhancements reduce the incentives for Bs to avoid As for fear of victimization,
thereby foregoing valuable trading opportunities.
5 Discussion
The analysis in the preceding three sections of the paper has shown that penalty
enhancements for bias-motivated crimes are socially optimal in certain circum-
stances. However, a further challenge remains - it is unclear whether the con-
ditions that our results identify as those in which penalty enhancements are
optimal correspond to those in which we actually observe HCLs being enacted.
In particular, recall that our formulation of the notion of bias - with offenders
deriving different benefits from crimes against members of different groups -
does not impose any restrictions on the nature of the groups involved. Thus,
the disfavored group B may, for instance, be homeless people, or the ‘geeks’ dis-
cussed in Blake (2001), rather than, say, racial minorities. Yet, HCLs typically
restrict their scope to racial and religious minorities, and a few other groups; in
general, not all groups that may conceivably be the targets of bias-motivated
crime are included. Thus, Posner (2001, p. 233) has recently argued that “.
. . advocates of enhanced punishment for “hate crimes” mean by the term
[only] . . . crimes against members of groups for which they have a particular
solicitude, such as blacks, Jews, and homosexuals.” He suggests (p. 235) that
HCLs involve “. . . varying the severity of punishment . . . in order to
make a political or ideological statement or, what is often the same thing, to
accommodate the pressures of politically influential groups.”
We believe that our results can be used to develop a principled justification
for HCLs, in contrast to Posner’s (2001) view that they are the result of in-
terest group pressures.20 Consider first the efficiency condition (5) for penalty
20An alternative perspective on this issue is provided by Blake (2001), for whom both the
gain to the perpetrator and the harmful effects of selective victimization are equally important
in understanding hate crimes. However, whereas the latter implies a broad definition of hate
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enhancement derived in Section 2. It is noteworthy that HCLs typically protect
groups (such as racial minorities) against which there is a long history of prej-
udice. Such a history often entails that hostility towards the group is relatively
widespread; thus, a relatively large number of potential offenders derive large
benefits from attacking members of the group, and hence a relatively large num-
ber of offenders can be deterred by including the group within the scope of HCLs.
In terms of condition (5), one would expect that, for large values of b, fB(b)
(the density of potential offenders) would be relatively large. This, of course, is
precisely one of the conditions required for penalty enhancements to be socially
optimal (see the discussion in Section 2 above). In contrast, for a group such
as the homeless or the ‘geeks’, the number of potential bias-motivated offenders
is likely to be relatively small, given the absence of a centuries-long tradition
of prejudice. If so, there will be less potential for deterrence through penalty
enhancements (fB(b) would be relatively small over the relevant range).
In any event, crimes against groups such as the homeless are more likely to
be the result of the lower direct costs (in terms of the likelihood of resistance
and so forth) of such crimes (and the consequently higher net benefit), rather
than from higher gross benefits due to the victims’ group affiliation per se.
The Federal sentencing guidelines (and the sentencing practices of many states)
accommodate such cases by requiring enhanced punishment of crimes against
especially vulnerable victims, independently of HCLs. Thus, HCLs may be both
unwarranted and unnecessary for groups such as the homeless.
Secondly, consider the argument in Section 4 concerning the social costs of
victimization avoidance activity. In addition to having faced a long history of
prejudice, groups protected by HCLs are usually defined by characteristics that
are immutable (such as race or ancestry), or at least are very costly to change
or disguise, because they constitute essential aspects of members’ identities. A
member of such a minority faced with the prospect of victimization by bias-
motivated crime can only respond by avoiding members of the dominant group
A, whereas members of groups such as the homeless or the ‘geeks’ can adjust
along a number of dimensions, for instance, by ‘passing’ as members of the
dominant group.21 The latter are therefore not forced to forego as many trading
opportunities with As, so that the social losses from victimization avoidance
activity are likely to be lower. Hence, there is less need for penalty enhancements
as a means of reducing the losses from victimization avoidance activity.
Finally, note that the fairness concerns raised in Section 3 are likely to be
especially pertinent when groups are defined by immutable characteristics, or
when they have experienced a long history of prejudice. This constitutes an
additional reason why such groups may warrant protection through HCLs. The
crime, the former is more useful in explaining the relatively narrow definition adopted by most
HCLs. Thus, Blake argues that violence against the homeless or the ‘geeks’ does not incur
enhanced penalties, not because it is necessarily less harmful than racial attacks, but because
the victims are not perceived as belonging to a well-identified group.
21We do not mean to suggest that it is fair for such groups to be forced to disguise their
identity in order to avoid victimization; rather, we are simply pointing out that such a group
has more options in responding to the threat of bias-motivated crime.
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general point here is that the characteristics of the groups that are included
within the scope of the typical HCL closely track those that would be expected
from the conditions for the social optimality of penalty enhancements that we
have derived. This suggests that HCLs can be explained with reference to the
social welfare maximizing choice of sanctions, rather than to interest group
pressures. In particular, efficiency-based explanations for HCLs should not be
discounted simply because not all groups that are targets of bias-motivated
crime are included within their purview. However, it should be remembered
that our examination of this issue is of a preliminary nature, and it is likely
that both factors play some role in the real world; there is thus a need for
further research that compares the efficiency explanation for HCLs with the
rent-seeking approach.
6 Conclusion
The issue of bias-motivated crimes against minorities has become an important
issue in criminal law and legal scholarship. In this paper, we have developed an
economic framework to analyze penalty enhancements for hate crimes. We have
generalized the standard economic model of crime to allow for the possibility
that there are different groups of potential victims, and that potential offenders
may derive different benefits from crimes against each group. While beginning
with the assumption that the harm to an individual victim of a hate crime is the
same as that to the victim of an identical non-hate crime, we have shown that
the social harm that results from a pattern of discriminatory selection of victims
can exceed that from a pattern of crimes where targets are randomly chosen.
This conclusion follows either if there exists a social loss from disparities in the
victimization probabilities of different groups (due to fairness concerns), or if
it is assumed that potential victims have the opportunity to undertake socially
costly avoidance activities. In particular, penalty enhancements can reduce the
incentives for avoidance activity, and thereby protect the networks of profitable
interactions that link members of different groups. We also argue that, while
only a subset of groups subject to bias-motivated crime are included within the
scope of hate crime laws, the characteristics of those groups that are included
are such that it is especially likely that the conditions for the social optimality
of penalty enhancement are satisfied.
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